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Abstract 
We report experimental evidence on gender differences in financial decision that involves 
three depositors choosing between waiting or withdrawing their money from a common bank. 
We find that the position in the line, the fact of being observed and the observed decisions are 
key determinants to explain subjects’ behavior. Although both men and women value being 
observed, it has a greater effect on women’s decisions. Observing a withdrawal increases the 
likelihood of withdrawal but women and men do not react differently to what is observed, so 
they are equally likely to panic if a bank run is already underway. Interestingly, risk aversion 
has no predictive power on depositors’ behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Starting with the run on Northern Rock in the UK in 2007, the financial crisis has shown that 
bank runs are still a topic of first-order importance worldwide. Examples include the 
experiences of Washington Mutual, Bear Stearns, the IndyMac Bank, the Bank of East Asia 
or the fourth largest lender in Spain, Bankia. 
During the previous waves of bank runs (the last one during the Great Depression) depositors 
were overwhelmingly men. However, due to social progress and changes in labor conditions, 
the gap in the proportion of men and women among the banks’ depositors is closing. Because 
gender differences in preferences have been identified in different dimensions (see Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009, for a review), this may have relevant implications concerning how bank 
run episodes unfold nowadays. More concretely, women generally exhibit a higher degree of 
risk aversion what may suggest that they will be more likely to participate in a bank run. 
We report experimental evidence on gender differences in a bank run situation. Our 
experimental design is based on the coordination problem formulated by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) that we modify to allow for different levels of observability, following Kiss et 
al. (2012a, 2012b). Diamond and Dybvig (1983) represent the depositors’ coordination 
problem as a simultaneous-move game in which multiple equilibria emerge, one of which has 
depositors participating in a bank run. In their seminal model, individuals may suffer a 
liquidity shock after depositing their funds in a bank. This results in two different types: 
impatient depositors (who need their money immediately) and patient depositors (who derive 
utility both from immediate and future consumption). Liquidity type is private information, 
but there is no aggregate uncertainty about the number of patient and impatient depositors. 
Importantly, the payoff structure is such that patient depositors will get the highest possible 
payoff if they decide not to withdraw their money from the bank, however it is also possible 
to have a (bank run) equilibrium in which they decide to withdraw. In the current paper, we 
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also consider the case in which patient depositors get the highest payoff by waiting and define 
a bank run as a situation in which a patient depositor withdraws. One noteworthy aspect of 
our design that makes our paper differs from Diamond and Dybving (see Kiss et al. 2012a, 
2012b) is that depositors choose sequentially between waiting or withdrawing their money, 
what implies that i) depositors may observe what other depositors have done before taking 
their decision, and ii) depositors know if other depositors will observe their decisions.4  
We hypothesize that two forces may affect the decision of the patient depositors. The first one 
concerns the observation of other depositors’ decision. For example, knowing that another 
depositor has already withdrawn might foster panicking behavior and favor further 
withdrawals, since a patient depositor observing that someone else withdraws does not know 
if (s)he is observing the impatient or the patient depositor. On the other hand, depositors at the 
beginning of the line might behave differently if their actions are being observed by 
subsequent depositors. More precisely, if a depositor is observed by the other depositors, then 
(s)he may decide to wait to induce the other depositors to do so as well, getting the highest 
possible payoff. 
This paper studies if there are gender differences in withdrawal decisions, after controlling for 
risk preferences. Gender differences in other financial settings (different from depositor 
behavior) have been studied extensively. There are studies analyzing gender differences in 
retirement decisions (e.g. Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001; Sunden and Surette, 1998; Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007), mutual fund and pension investments (Dwyer, Gilkeson and List, 2002; 
Felton, Gibson and Sanbonmatsu, 2003; and Martenson, 2008), real estate investment (Seiler, 
Seiler and Lane, 2012) and trading activity (Kourtidis, Sevic and Chatzoglou, 2011). There 
are also some papers that find gender differences in the way people reacted to the recent 
                                                        
4 Iyer and Puri (2012) and Kelly and O’Grada (2000)  provide empirical evidence that many depositors know 
about other depositors’ choices (both waiting and withdrawal) and react to them when making their decisions. In 
their experiment on bank runs, Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) and Kiss, Rodríguez-Lara and Rosa-García 
(2012a, 2012b) note that observability of actions indeed affects the subjects’ behavior in the lab.  
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financial crisis (see for instance Söderberg and Wester, 2012). Though there is a growing 
experimental and empirical literature on bank runs (see Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; 
Garratt and Keister, 2009; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Brown, Trautmann 
and Vlahu, 2012, for some recent examples and Dufwenberg, 2012, for a survey on 
experimental banking, including a section on bank runs), to the best of our knowledge this is 
the first experimental study that specifically investigates gender differences in this context. 
We are only aware of two empirical studies that touch upon gender differences in bank run 
situations (Kelly and O’Grada, 2000; O’Grada and White, 2003). Both involve two bank runs 
in New York in 1854 and 1857 and gender was not clearly found to play a role in explaining 
panicking behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the bank-run game that 
is played in our experiment, which is outlined in Section 3. Section 4 contains the 
experimental results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.The bank-run game with observability of actions 
We describe in this section the coordination problem that is played in each round of the 
experiment. Our game relies on the model of Kiss et al. (2012a, 2012b), who extend the 
model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to allow for observability of actions. 
Consider a bank that is formed by 3 depositors. At t=0, each of them deposits her/his initial 
endowment (in our experiment, 80 ECUs) in this bank that has thus initially 240 ECUs to be 
invested in a project. The project yields a sure high return in period t=2, but the investment 
can be liquidated without any cost at t=1. 
In t=1 depositors choose in an exogenously determined sequence whether they want to 
withdraw their initial endowment or keep it deposited. Depositor i is the one that chooses in 
position i, where i = 1,2,3. If a depositor decides to withdraw, (s)he immediately receives 100 
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ECUs as long as there is enough money in the bank to pay this amount (out of this amount, 80 
ECUs correspond to the initial endowment and 20 ECUs are obtained in the form of interests). 
In our experiment, if depositors 1 or 2 withdraw, they receive 100 ECUs for sure. But if 
depositor 3 decides to withdraw after two withdrawals, (s)he only receives 40 ECUs (because 
the first two depositors who withdrew received 100 ECUs each and the bank has only 40 
ECUs to pay depositor 3). However, if depositor 3 withdraws after one withdrawal and one 
waiting, the bank pays her/him 100 ECUs. 
Depositors who decide to wait receive their payoff in period t=2. The amount that depositors 
receive in t=2 depends on the total number of waitings. If only one depositor waits, (s)he 
receives 60 ECUs. If two depositors wait, then their payoff is 140 ECUs. In our model, we 
assume that the three depositors cannot wait and keep the money deposited in the bank. In 
particular, one of the depositors is hit by a liquidity shock at t=1 and is forced to withdraw. In 
line with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there exists no aggregate uncertainty about the 
fundamental demand; i.e., it is common information in our setup that one of the depositors 
will need the money and will be forced to withdraw. We refer to this depositor who is forced 
to withdraw as impatient depositor, whereas depositors who can wait or withdraw their money 
are called patient.  
The decision situation in our study is such that it pays off for patient depositors to wait if they 
know or believe that the other patient depositor does so as well, so that we define a bank run 
as a situation in which at least one of them withdraws. Our setup differs in two important 
ways from standard coordination games: i) decision of depositors will be observable 
conditional on the information structure; ii) one of the depositors always withdraw, increasing 
substantially the degree of strategic uncertainty. More precisely, in a setup in which a patient 
depositor observes a withdrawal, (s)he will not know if this was due to the impatient depositor 
or to a patient depositor that decided to run the bank. Similarly, in a context in which nothing 
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is observed, a patient depositor will decide having uncertainty about what the other patient 
depositor is doing (or will do). We want to study how different information structures and the 
observability of actions affect men’s and women’s decisions.  
 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
We recruited a total of 60 subjects (30 men, 30 women) with no previous experience in 
coordination problems or experiments dealing with financial decisions. We ran two sessions 
at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX) of Universidad de 
Valencia in June 2013, with an even distribution of gender within each session. All 
participants in the experiment were students from Economic and Business School. 
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions 
were read aloud and the bank-run game described in Section 2 was played during 15 rounds. 
At the beginning of each round, each subject was informed that (s)he had been matched in a 
random pair and assigned a third depositor (simulated by the computer) so as to form a three-
depositor bank.5 Likewise, she/he was told that she had deposited her/his initial endowment 
(80 ECUs) in the common bank. All these information was publicly known. Appendix A 
contains the instructions. 
Each depositor was also then privately informed about her/his position in the sequence of 
decision (i=1,2,3). It was common knowledge that this position was randomly and 
exogenously determined, so that subjects were equally likely to be in each position. 
Depositors decided then in sequence (according to their position in the line) whether to 
withdraw their money from the bank or keep it deposited (that we call waiting). If the action 
of the depositor was going to be observed by some subsequent depositor, she was also 
                                                        
5 Since the impatient depositor always withdraws, to maximize the amount of data we had the computer 
act as the impatient depositor. 
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informed about it. In the same way, if the depositor was observing a predecessor in the line, 
(s)he was informed about her/his action before deciding.  
We considered all possible information structures that a depositor in any position could 
observe and whether (s)he was observed or not. Depositors had only local knowledge of the 
information structure, that is, they did not know if the other two depositors were linked or not. 
Hence, knowing i) the position; ii) what predecessor(s) did; and iii) the link(s) to subsequent 
depositors was the only information that was available to the subjects.  
 
Figure 1. Screenshots for depositors 1 and 2.  
Figure 1A. Depositor 1 Figure 1B. Depositor 2 
 
In Figure 1 we present some screenshots of our experiment. In Figure 1A, we show the case 
of depositor 1 who is asked to choose between waiting (“esperar”) or withdrawing (“retirar”). 
The figure on the left-hand side shows that depositor 1 knows that depositor 2 in the line will 
observe her/his decision, but (s)he is unaware if depositor 3 observes depositor 2 or not. 
Because there is no link between depositor 1 and 3, depositor 1 knows that 3 will not observe 
his/her action. Figure 1B presents the case of a depositor 2 who has observed a waiting and 
has to decide what to do. Depositor 2 knows that depositor 3 will observe her/his decision.  
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In each round, subjects’ payoff depended on their decisions and on their position in the line. 
Next we present the payoff table that subjects received in the instructions of the experiment.6  
 
  
 
In you decide to wait in the first year and 
withdraw in the second, the… 
 
Number of previous 
withdrawals 
 
If you withdraw the 
first year 
If you both wait and 
only the computer 
withdraws  
If, in addition to the 
computer, the other 
depositor withdraws 
0 100 140 60 
1 100 140 60 
2 40 Not applicable 60 
Table 1: The payoff table 
These payoffs imply that depositor 3 was always better off if (s)he waited, while depositor 1 
and 2 received the highest payoff if they did the same action than the other experimental 
subject. 7 
It was common information in our experiment that three depositors formed the bank and the 
computer was programmed to always withdraw (acting as the impatient depositor). In each 
round subjects were asked to choose between waiting or withdrawing. We note that the 
position in the line and the information structure changed across rounds (i.e., in each round, 
subjects were placed in a different position or faced a different environment in that their links 
were different).  
In both sessions, subjects were divided into three matching groups of 10. Subjects from 
different matching groups never interacted with each other throughout the session. Subjects 
within the same matching group were randomly and anonymously matched in pairs at the end 
of each round.  
At the end of the experiment, subjects filled out a questionnaire that was used to collect 
additional information about gender and the degree of risk aversion. We elicited risk attitudes 
using the investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997). Each subject hypothetically 
                                                        
6 The payoffs were also explained to subjects at the bottom of their screenshoot (see Figure 1).  
7 In our setup, waiting in position 3 yields 140 ECUs (60 ECUs) if only the computer has withdrawn (in addition 
to the computer, the other depositor has withdrawn), whereas withdrawing yields 100 ECUs (40 ECUs). 
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received 10 Euros and was asked to choose how much of it, $x, (s)he wanted to invest in a 
risky option and how much (s)he wished to keep. The amount invested yielded a dividend 
$2.5x with ½ probability, being lost otherwise. The money not invested in the risky option 
$(10-x) was kept by the subject. In this situation, the expected value of investing is higher 
than the expected value of not investing; therefore a risk-neutral (or risk-loving) subject 
should invest the 10 Euros, whereas a risk-averse subject will invest less. The amount not 
invested in the risky asset is a natural measure of risk aversion.8 
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes and subjects received on average 16 Euros. For 
the payment, we used a random lottery incentive procedure by which one choice (i.e., one of 
the rounds) was paid out, with ECUs being transformed in Euros using the exchange rate 10 
ECUs = 1 Euro.  
 
4. Experimental Results 
4.1. Aggregate Data 
This section presents our main results. In Figure 2, we report the likelihood of withdrawal by 
gender in each position. We see that the position in the line affects depositor’s behavior, with 
depositors being more likely to withdraw in position 1 or 2 than in position 3. Gender does 
not seem to affect systematically depositors’ behavior. We observe that women (men) 
withdraw more frequently in position 2 and 3 (position 1), but gender differences are never 
significant (p-values > 0.146).9 
 
 
                                                        
8 Our questionnaire contained also four different lotteries in the spirit of[16] (2002). Although we choose to elicit 
risk aversion using Gneezy and Potters (1997), we can also proxy risk aversion by the number of times that a 
subject chose the risky choice in the Holt and Laury task. The results presented in the next section are invariant 
to the measure of risk aversion that we use as both measures are correlated (Correlation coefficient = 0.26, p-
value < 0.0000) 
9 Unless otherwise noted, the tests refer to the t-test and the Mann–Whitney U.  
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Figure 2: Decisions by gender in each position  
An interesting question concerns depositors’ behavior in the presence (absence) of strategic 
uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty is absent if a subject can infer without problem the decision 
of the other subject in the room before deciding what to do. Obviously, this is never the case 
for the first depositor in the line (who has no information about what other depositors have 
done), whereas depositors 2 and 3 in the line make their decision in the absence of strategic 
uncertainty if they observe a waiting or depositor 3 observes the two previous actions. When 
depositor 2 or 3 observes either nothing or a withdrawal, their decisions are taken in a context 
of strategic uncertainty. In Figure 3 we group the data according to the cases in which 
depositors choose in the presence (absence) of strategic uncertainty 
In line with Figure 2, we observe that men and women behave similarly, once we condition 
on the presence or the absence of strategic uncertainty and on a particular position in the line 
(p-values > 0.443). 10 
 
 
                                                        
10  This is in line with previous evidence in the literature on coordination problems reporting no gender 
differences with regard to strategic uncertainty, e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2005;  Glaeser et al, 2000.  
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Figure 3: Decisions by gender in presence/absence of strategic uncertainty 
One interesting insight of Figure 3 is that strategic uncertainty increases the withdrawal rate 
for both men and women in position 2 and 3 (p-values < 0.0080). These findings highlight the 
importance of strategic uncertainty; however gender differences are not crucial to explain 
depositors’ behavior.  
 
4.2. Depositors’ behavior 
The position in the line and the information structure determine in our context what depositors 
might observe and whether subsequent depositors can observe their actions. To disentangle if 
there are gender differences in the effects of these variables on withdrawal decision, we 
analyze depositors’ behavior more in detail by performing an econometric analysis. We 
estimate a logit model on the probability of withdrawal in each position. The set of 
independent variables includes the subject’s gender, the observation possibilities and the 
interaction effects. Our regressions also control for risk aversion, which is measured using the 
investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997).11 Because subjects are asked to make 
                                                        
11 Our data for risk aversion is consistent with previous evidence (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a summary 
of results) with men investing significantly more than women (Women: 4.97, Men: 5.80, p-value= 0.064). Along 
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decisions during 15 rounds, we control also for the history of decisions as Garrat and Keister 
(2009). In particular, the variable History measures the share of previous rounds in which the 
subject witnessed a bank run. 
 
4.1.1. Depositor 1’s behavior 
When depositor 1 chooses between waiting or withdrawing, (s)he has no information about 
what will occur in the bank. However, the depositor knows whether subsequent depositors 
will observe her/his decision or not. This can affect depositor 1’s decision as a patient 
depositor would like to wait to induce the other patient depositor to follow suit.12 Our data are 
consistent with such a behavioral pattern. When they are not being observed, men withdraw 
57% and women 64% of the times. These withdrawal rates decrease to 32% and 24% when 
one other depositor will observe the action of the first depositor, and to 11% and 16% when 
depositor 1 knows that the two other subsequent depositors will observe her/his action.  
In the logit specification the independent variables are the subject’s gender (W is equal to 0 
for men and 1 for women), the number of subsequent followers observing depositors (F1 
equals 1 if depositor 1 is observed by only one depositor, and F2 equals 1 if she is observed 
by two depositors) and the interaction effects, controlling for risk aversion and history 
(History). In Table 2 we report our estimates, the standard errors of the parameters (which 
take into account the matching group clustering) and the marginal effects.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this line, we find that men take more risky lotteries than women in the Holt and Laury task (p-value= 0.001). 
Both the investment decision and the Holt and Laury task yield a measure of risk aversion that is significantly 
correlated with gender (p-values = 0.044 and 0.007 respectively), with women being more risk averse.  
12 Kiss et al. (2012b) find that depositors in the first position are more likely to wait if their actions are being 
observed. This may be related to contribution in public good games and strategic commitment in Choi et al. 
(2011). 
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 Logit Coefficients Marginal Effect 
 Coefficient Robust Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
F1 -1.441*** 0.52 -0.249*** 0.08 
F2 -3.682*** 0.89 -0.369*** 0.05 
W -0.180 0.81 -0.031 0.13 
WF1 -1.065 0.81 -0.157 0.11 
WF2 1.107 1.27 0.231 0.28 
Risk Aversion  0.117 0.10 0.020 0.02 
History 7.374*** 0.72 1.260*** 0.24 
Intercept -3.729*** 0.68   
Log-Likelihood -112.17 
Pseudo R2 0.41 
N 299 
Note. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Table 2: Logit regression for Depositor 1. 
We do not find gender differences in the baseline model, where actions are not being 
observed (F1 = F2 = 0). Our estimates indicate that both men and women value that their 
actions will be observed as they are less likely to withdraw if one or two other depositors 
observe their actions (p-values < 0.0006). We also find that men and women react differently 
to the fact of being observed, with the decrease in the withdrawal rate being higher for women 
when we compare the case in which nothing is observed with the one in which one action is 
observed (chi2(1) =   3.36, p-value = 0.0669).13 Along these lines, we reject for men the null 
hypothesis that the withdrawal rate when they have one subsequent observing depositor is the 
same as the withdrawal rate when they have two (χ2 =  7.17, p-value = 0.0074), while women 
do not care about the number of subsequent depositors that observe their choices; i.e., we 
cannot reject the previous null hypothesis for women at any common significance level (χ2 = 
0.01, p-value  = 0.9310). When we compare men and women’s behavior we do not find any 
gender differences.  
 
 
 
                                                        
13 As noted, the withdrawal rate for men (women) decreases from 57% to 32% (from 64% to 24%), when their 
actions are being observed by a subsequent depositor. 
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Result 1.  
i) Women initiate bank runs as frequently as men when their decisions are not observed.  
ii) When one subsequent depositor observes their decisions, the likelihood of withdrawal 
reduces both for men and women, although the decrease is higher for women, ceteris paribus. 
iii) When both subsequent depositors observe their decisions, both men and women are 
significantly less likely to withdraw, compared with the case in which decisions are not 
observed. There is no difference in the withdrawal rate of women when having one or two 
subsequent observing depositor, whereas men withdraw less frequently when observed by two 
other depositors.  
 
4.2. Depositor 2 
Depositor 2 might choose after observing nothing (ObsNo), or after having observed what 
depositor 1 has already done. In this latter case, depositor 2 can either observe a waiting 
(ObsWa) or a withdrawal (ObsWi). Interestingly, the observation of the withdrawal arises in a 
context of strategic uncertainty as depositor 2 is not be able to identify if this was due to the 
computer or the other subject in the room. Figure 3 already suggests that strategic uncertainty 
may play an important role. Depositor 2 is more likely to withdraw upon observing nothing or 
a withdrawal, than upon observing a waiting. But being observed or not may also influence 
depositor 2’s decision.  
To see if there are gender differences in how the observation of previous decisions and the 
fact of not being observed influence the depositor 2’s behavior, we perform an econometric 
analysis. Our baseline model relies on the case in which depositor 2 observes nothing. The 
dummy variable ObsWi (ObsWa) takes the value 1 if a withdrawal (a waiting) is observed, 
with W standing for the depositor’s gender –we interact these dummies to investigate whether 
men and women react differently to what is being observed. We shall also take into account 
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that depositor 2’s decision may be observed by depositor 3 (i.e., the dummy variable F1 takes 
the value 1 in this case). To distinguish between men and women’s reaction to what is being 
observed when there is (not) a link with depositor 3, we interact the depositor 2’s gender and 
what is being observed with F1. Finally, we control for the degree of risk aversion and what 
subjects observed in previous rounds (History), as we did in the case of depositor 1. Our 
estimates for this specification are reported in Table 3.14 
 
 Logit Coefficients Marginal Effect 
 Coefficient Robust Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
W -0.877 0.72 -0.206 0.17 
ObsWi  0.757 0.89  0.181 0.21 
ObsWa -3.561*** 0.56 -0.427*** 0.04 
F1 -1.301*** 0.38 -0.300*** 0.09 
WObsWi -0.32 1.21 -0.007 0.29 
WF1  0.847 1.06  0.205 0.26 
F1ObsWi  0.143 0.78  0.034 0.18 
WF1ObsWi  0.199 1.14  0.048 0.28 
Risk Aversion -0.016 0.12 -0.004 0.03 
History  6.353*** 1.12  1.508*** 0.28 
Intercept -2.930** 1.26   
Log-Likelihood -111.17 
Pseudo R2 0.36 
N 252 
Note. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
WObsWa, F1ObsWa and WF1ObsWa are excluded because they predict waiting perfectly. 
Table 3: Logit regression for Depositor 2. 
 
Our estimates indicate that observing a withdrawal does not have any influence on men’s or 
women’s behavior (p-values>0.2526), whereas the observation of a waiting significantly 
decreases their likelihood of withdrawal (p-values<0.0000).15 This, in turn, implies that we 
can easily reject the null hypothesis that depositors’ choice is invariant to what is being 
                                                        
14 We note that the dummy variables F1ObsWa, WObsWa and WF1ObsWa have been eliminated from the 
analysis because i) men who observed a waiting and know that their actions will be observed, and ii) women 
who observe a waiting (regardless of whether they are linked with depositor 3 or not), never withdraw their 
money from the bank; i.e., F1ObsWa, WObsWa and WF1ObsWa predict waiting perfectly.  
15 In fact, depositor 2 waits in 53 out of the 54 cases in what (s)he observes a waiting, and waits only in 39 out of 
the 94 occasions in which (s)he observes a withdrawal.  
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observed (p-values<0.0000). When we look at gender differences in behavior, we do not find 
any evidence that men and women behave differently, neither in the baseline model where 
nothing is observed (p-value=0.218) nor when a waiting or a withdrawal is observed (p-
values>0.2259). Overall, these findings are in line with our description of Figure 3 and 
highlight that strategic uncertainty is the major force driving depositor’s behavior, with men 
and women withdrawing more frequently when nothing or a withdrawal is observed. Women 
and men react similarly to what they observe.  
One interesting insight from our regression analysis is that men do care about their link with 
depositor 3 (p-values < 0.0050), whereas women do not value the fact of being observed by 
depositor 3 (p-values > 0.6028). This finding seems to support our Result 1 in what men care 
more than women about the number of links.  
 
Result 2.  
i) Withdrawal rates increase in situations of strategic uncertainty (i.e., when nothing or a 
withdrawal is observed), but we do not find evidence for gender differences in behavior.  
ii) Men value the fact of being observed by depositor 3 more than women do. 
 
4.3. Depositor 3  
Depositor 3 was always better off by waiting16 and did it in 90% of the cases. Interestingly, 
the description of our data in Figures 2 and 3 indicates that withdrawals in position 3 occur 
when there exists strategic uncertainty and depositor 3 is not able to infer what the other 
patient depositor has done.  
To investigate whether gender differences are important for depositor 3, we estimate a logit 
model in which the baseline specification assumes that there is no strategic uncertainty; i.e., 
                                                        
16 See footnote 4.  
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we pool the cases in which a waiting or the two previous actions are observed.17 We then 
define the dummy variable StrUnc, which takes the value 1 if a withdrawal or nothing is 
observed. Our specification controls for gender, risk aversion and the history of decisions and 
our estimates are presented in Table 4.18  
 Logit Coefficients Marginal Effect 
 Coefficient Robust Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
W  0.461 1.36  0.020 0.06 
StrUnc  1.800 1.26  0.087 0.72 
WStrUnc -0.579 1.45 -0.051 0.04 
Risk Aversion -0.007 0.13 -0.000 0.01 
History  5.348*** 1.23  1.508*** 0.28 
Intercept -6.594** 1.71   
Log-Likelihood -78.51 
Pseudo R2 0.25 
N 312 
Note. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Table 4: Logit regression for Depositor 3. 
Once we control for the history of decisions and risk aversion, we observe that strategic 
uncertainty does not have any significant effect on men’s behavior. The same is true for 
women (chi2 (1) = 2.40; p-value = 0.1216). Along similar lines, gender has no predicting 
power in explaining withdrawal rates as men and women cannot be rejected to behave in the 
same manner both when there is strategic uncertainty (p-values = 0.8512), and when there is 
not (p-value = 0.737).  
Result 3.  
We find that neither strategic uncertainty nor gender have an effect on the depositors’ 
behavior in position 3. 
 
                                                        
17 Observing two withdrawals or a waiting and a withdrawal predicts waiting perfectly for both men and women. 
Men do never withdraw if a waiting and a withdrawal is observed, whereas 4 out of the 32 women’s choices 
correspond to withdrawing in this scenario. We note that these 4 choices correspond to 2 subjects. 
18 We define only a dummy for the case of strategic uncertainty because for depositor 3 we have a very small 
number of withdrawals, thus there is small variability in the data, and with a more detailed model we would 
require several regressors more. 
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Besides the described effect of gender, observability and strategic uncertainty, one important 
finding is that risk aversion is not significant in none of the regressions. On the contrary, the 
history of decisions seems to have a predictive power as the frequency of bank runs that the 
subject witnessed tend to increase the likelihood of withdrawal in any position. While the 
latter result is in line with Garratt and Keister (2009) and Kiss et al. (2012b), the former one 
points out that decisions in our setup are not driven by the attitude toward risk.19 In our view, 
this is an interesting finding. Risk aversion is sometimes related to subjects’ behavior in 
financial decisions. In the particular case of a bank run episode, the fact that women are 
usually more risk averse could be interpreted as they being more likely to participate in bank 
run situation. We find that women are more risk averse than men, but risk aversion seems to 
play no role in withdrawal decisions. 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
After the recent financial turmoil, researchers have shown keen interest in studying what 
factors affect the widespread appearance and propagation of bank runs. One interesting 
question to be addressed is how men and women behave in this context, an issue that has been 
disregarded by the literature.  
We present experimental data where the bank run problem is modeled as a coordination game 
(as originally proposed by Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) with depositors choosing sequentially 
between waiting or withdrawing, after potentially observing previous decisions (Schotter and 
Yorulmazer, 2009; Garrat and Keister, 2009; Kiss et al., 2012a; Kiss et al., 2012b).  
Similarly to Kiss et al. (2012b), our results highlight that the information structure is a key 
element to explain subjects’ behavior. Our main contribution is to show that men and women 
initiate bank runs equally, and react to the observation of withdrawals in a similar manner. 
                                                        
19 Even if we omit risk aversion from the regressions, gender does not become significant in the baseline cases. 
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We find that both men and women value the fact that their actions will be observed, although 
there exists some gender differences worth mentioning: whereas women are more affected 
than men by the fact of being observed, men are more concerned about the number of 
subsequent depositors that will observe their decisions.  
When we investigate how men and women react to what is being observed, we find that 
strategic uncertainty (e.g., observing nothing or a withdrawal) has a predictive power in our 
sample by increasing the likelihood of withdrawal, but no gender difference in behavior are 
found. Overall, these results could be interpreted as men being more concerned about whether 
their financial decisions will be observed, but there are no gender differences in the reaction 
to observing withdrawal(s). 
One interesting finding in our paper relates to attitudes towards risk. There is a robust 
literature on the existence of a gender difference regarding risk aversion. Consistent with 
previous findings, our data indicate that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., Charness 
& Gneezy, 2012; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), but it does not translate into a more panicking 
behavior. Numerous studies show that women and men behave differently when making 
diverse financial decisions due to the differences in risk aversion. We provide evidence that 
this is not the case in our particular setup that resembles a coordination game. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (originally in Spanish) 
Welcome to the experiment! 
This is an experiment to study decision making, so we are not interested in your particular 
choices but in individuals' average behavior. Therefore, during the experiment you'll be 
treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know 
your particular choices.  
Next, you will find the instructions in the computer screen explaining how the experiment 
unfolds. The instructions are the same for all subjects in the laboratory and will be read aloud 
by experimenters. It is important for you to understand the experiment before starting, as the 
money that you will earn will depend on your choices.  
Should you have any problem during the experiment, raise your hand and remember that you 
are not allowed to speak with anyone except the experimenter. 
Number of round 
This experiment has 18 rounds in total. The first 3 rounds are for you to become familiar with 
the software. The remaining 15 rounds will be used to determine your final payoff, so please 
be sure that you understand the experiment before starting the 4th round. This will help you to 
earn more money.  
Deposits 
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided a certain amount of money (80 ECUs) 
to be deposited in a bank. The bank in which you will invest your money will be formed by 3 
depositors: one of them is you, the other one is someone else in this room and the third 
depositor is simulated by the computer. Therefore, the bank in which you deposit your money 
will have 240 ECUs per round in total.  
Decisions and Earnings 
In principle, your decision is to choose whether to withdraw your money from the common 
bank in the first period or to wait until the second period, taking into account that your 
earnings will depend not only on your choice but also on other depositors' choices. Indeed, it 
is important to know that the computer will always withdraw her money, thus your earnings 
in each round will only depend on your choice and the choice of the other depositor in this 
room.  
Specifically, if you both wait until the second period to withdraw your money, you will get 
140 ECUs, corresponding to your initial investment (80 ECUs) plus interests generated during 
the first period of time (in which you have decided to wait).  
If only one of you withdraws the money, then the one who withdraws takes 100 ECUs 
(exactly the same amount that the computer will take in this case). The depositor who waits 
will receive 60 ECUs (corresponding to the remaining amount in the bank after two 
withdrawals – 40 ECUs –plus an additional 20 ECUs as interests).  
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Finally, it might be the case that both of you withdraw your money in the first period. As a 
result, your earnings will depend on the available amount of money in the bank and your 
position in the line. Therefore, if you are at Position 1 or Position 2 in the line and decide to 
withdraw, you will receive 100 ECUs, but if you are the last one in the line (Position 3), only 
40 ECUs remain in the bank and this is exactly the amount of money that you will receive.  
Therefore, your payoffs can be summarized in the following table:  
  
 
In you decide to wait in the first year and 
withdraw in the second, the… 
 
Number of previous 
withdrawals 
 
If you withdraw the 
first year 
If you both wait 
and only the 
computer 
withdraws  
If, in addition to the 
computer, the other 
depositor 
withdraws 
0 100 140 60 
1 100 140 60 
2 40 Not applicable 60 
Please remember that the depositor simulated by the computer will always withdraw the 
money in the first period.  
Before starting, it may be important for you to consider that:  
1. The person with whom you are linked will change every round. As a result, do not think 
that you are going to play with the same person.  
2. You will always know your position in the line, but this position might change in each 
round. In particular, you may be located at Position 1, Position 2 or Position 3 with the same 
probability. The same is true for the computer.  
3. In each round, you will have different information about what other depositors at your bank 
have done. Therefore, in some cases, you will know what has happened before you arrived at 
the bank (number of waitings and withdrawals) and in some other cases, you will not. At the 
time of making your choice, you will also know whether someone else will observe your 
decision. It may be of your interest to consider this information when making your decision. 
The information will appear on the left-hand side of the computer screen:  
E.g., You are at Position 1. Depositors at Position 2 and Position 3 will observe your choice.  
E.g., You are at Position 2. Depositor at Position 1 has waited. Depositor at Position 3 will 
not observe your choices  
On the right side of your screen a small graph shows with whom you are linked (that is whom 
do you observe and who will observe you). If there is no link between two depositors, it 
indicates that the one that decides later, cannot observe the decision of the other. If you see 
“?” it indicates that you do not know if the other two depositors are linked or not. 
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Final payoff 
When the experiment ends, we choose randomly one of the 15 rounds and pay according to 
the earnings of that round. We convert your earnings in that round at a rate 10 ECUs = 1 
Euro.  
We are now going to start with the first three rounds. At the end of the three rounds, you can 
ask any questions to make sure that you have understood the procedure. If you have any doubt 
afterwards, please raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the 
experimenters as soon as possible. Talking is forbidden during this experiment.  
 
 
 
